

# Outside Options: Power-sharing in the Shadow of External Intervention after Civil War\*

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## Abstract

Power-sharing settlements to civil wars are often reached in the shadow of external intervention. We argue that the spectre of external intervention undermines the effectiveness of power sharing in general, and territorial autonomy in particular. Shifts in the power balance between a government and former rebels induced by changes in actual or anticipated foreign support induce commitment problems that undermine power-sharing arrangements. Due to the generally weaker position of rebel actors, gaining or losing an outside option proves particularly severe for rebel organizations. Shifts in foreign support further increase the risk of conflict recurrence in the context of territorial power sharing where the inability to monitor the other side compounds the underlying commitment problem. In a mixed methods design, we test for differences in the recurrence rate of intrastate conflicts that ended in territorial power sharing with and without prior intervention. We then provide process-tracing evidence from four cases of armed conflicts that reveal how foreign intervention contributed to the failure of autonomy settlements. Our key finding—that the effectiveness of territorial power sharing as a conflict resolution strategy is conditional on patterns of external intervention—has important implications for the management of ethno-territorial civil wars.

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Most ethnic wars end with some degree of power-sharing. To induce combatants to stop fighting and reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, both *inclusive* power sharing (allocating positions of power in the central government to different ethnic groups) and *dispersive* power sharing (granting autonomy to territorially concentrated ethnic groups) have become standard policy responses to internal armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Existing research demonstrates that power sharing can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence by protecting minority interests (Lijphart, 1977; O’Leary, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Cederman et al., 2015). Yet critics argue that ethnic power sharing —especially *dispersive* power sharing— is inherently unstable. The decentralization of power in ethnically divided states can weaken national identification, provide aspiring separatists with the symbols and administrative apparatus of a proto-state, and strengthen ethnic elites and regional parties, fueling ever-growing demands for independence (Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 2005; Brancati, 2006).

While there is a substantial literature on the effects of power sharing on post-war outcomes,<sup>1</sup> one key dimension has been ignored: how the spectre of foreign intervention affects the stability of postwar power sharing. This is an important omission given that in a large number of cases, rebels and governments receive foreign support. External intervention intensifies violence (Lacina, 2006), prolongs civil wars (Regan, 2000, 2002; Anderson, 2019), and complicates efforts to find a settlement (Rothchild, 1997). This paper broadens our understanding of the effects of intervention in ethnic conflicts by considering the *legacy* of wartime intervention on the postwar peace transition. Specifically, the paper asks whether the conflict-reducing effect of territorial power sharing is conditional on prior intervention.

Our key argument is that intervention could affect the stability of power-sharing regimes by making the parties’ commitments time-inconsistent. We develop this argument in the context of the bargaining model of conflict. We do not address the effects of *actual* intervention, as is the usual approach in the extent literature on civil war duration or termination. Rather, we analyze the effects of the *spectre* of intervention by identifying cases in which intervention occurred

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<sup>1</sup>Much of the prior literature focuses on the effect of power-sharing *agreements* (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009, 2010), but power sharing can also emerge in wars that end in a victory. We consider such cases and do not restrict our analysis to power-sharing after settlements.

during the last phase of the previous war. In such cases, prior involvement of a foreign actor is a proxy for a higher *ex ante* likelihood of *future* meddling by a foreign state. Indeed, in our data, recurring conflicts with prior intervention are twice as likely to have new intervention compared to those that had no prior intervention.

Unexpected, exogenous shocks can affect external patrons' interests in the conflict, thereby disturbing the power balance on which power-sharing is built on. As foreign patrons' commitment to their local clients changes, both governments and rebels have incentives to renege on their earlier commitments. Shifts in foreign support will have greater impact on former rebels, as they are generally weaker than the government, and thus more reliant on external assistance. Shifts in foreign support should weaken rebels' commitment to power sharing particularly in cases of dispersive power sharing: whereas joint rule in the central government allows both sides to closely monitor and police each other, territorial autonomy reduces the scope of such supervision. Fears of renegeing on the terms of power sharing by the government when a shift in foreign support looms can lead to preemptive action by the weaker side.

This argument pertains to *biased* intervention – defined as military assistance to help one party win. While impartial peacekeeping interventions have been extensively studied (Mattes and Savun, 2009; Walter, 1997; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006), less is known about how partial (biased) interventions affect the target countries' postwar trajectories. We uncover a neglected pathway through which international factors could shape internal armed conflict: in the spirit of second-image-reversed theories of international relations (Gourevitch, 1978), we emphasize the international or systemic context in which domestic political institutions can forge peace and security. We argue that domestic actors' commitments to the postwar order are shaped by expectations of major powers' interests and anticipated patterns of foreign intervention.

We employ a mixed method design to test this argument. Building on a recent study by Cederman et al. (2015) that investigates the consequences of inclusive and dispersive power sharing on the risk of territorial armed conflict, we expand the scope of the analysis by adding information on international intervention and find that post-conflict autonomy arrangements increase the risk of conflict recurrence when the spectre of intervention for rebels looms large.

We combine large-N analysis with four case studies to explore mechanisms — the Moro rebellion in the Philippines, the second Sudanese Civil War, the Punjab Insurgency in India, and the Cyprus conflict.

Nesting a set of process-tracing case studies within an overall quantitative framework proves to be a fruitful approach to studying the international and domestic aspects of civil war resolution. While the use of qualitative or mixed methods sometimes point to shortcomings of quantitative conflict studies (e.g., Krebs and Licklider, 2016), our investigation returns a more balanced assessment. Overall, the cases illustrate the plausibility of our argument and provide valuable out-of-sample verification of it, but they also uncover measurement issues in the quantitative data and help us develop more theoretical insights.

## Theory

The debate on the effectiveness of power sharing as a solution to ethnic war is equivocal. While some studies find that different types of power sharing reduces conflict (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Cederman et al., 2015), others argue that it increases the risk of violent conflict by empowering ethno-sectarian elites to pursue ever-expanding claims (Brancati, 2006; Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 2005). Despite the inconclusiveness of the scholarly debate, power sharing is now the default solution to ethnic war (Graham, Miller and Strøm, 2017). It is striking, therefore, that we know so little about the conditions under which it works.

According to the most recent figures from the UCDP Armed Conflict Database, 36% of low-intensity intrastate conflicts since 1945 were internationalized, involving “troops from external states supporting one or both sides in the conflict” (Pettersson, Högbladh and Öberg, 2019, 2). The actual extent of foreign interference in domestic conflicts is likely higher and a key insight is that foreign interventions enable weaker actors to fight longer in pursuit of more expansive aims, diminishing the range of feasible settlements (Regan, 2000, 2002) and prolonging war (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2020). Even the *anticipation* of intervention can lead to conflict escalation

(Sambanis, Skaperdas and Wohlforth, 2020), making it harder for local actors to settle disputes without rebellion and war (Kuperman, 2013). Interventions prolong or intensify conflicts by changing the information environment and by shaping local groups' assessments of the likelihood of a successful outcome; they also shape the preferences of local parties over different bargaining outcomes or over fighting versus bargaining (Cetinyan, 2002; Bas and Schub, 2016; Jenne, 2004; Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, 2015).

An argument that has not yet been considered in the literature is that prior intervention affects the postwar peace by shaping expectations of future intervention. Anticipated continuing external support by foreign patrons should be reflected in any power sharing settlement; but unanticipated shocks that change foreign patrons' commitment to local actors can undermine power sharing. Key to this argument is the premise that the availability of foreign backers during the previous war shapes perceptions of the balance of power in the postwar period and beliefs about the likely outcomes of unilateral deviations from power-sharing. Therefore, domestic groups with an "outside option" could be emboldened to pursue maximalist agendas.

Any power-sharing settlement will reflect the underlying balance of power, taking into account past investments by external sponsors. The stability of such arrangements will be threatened by unanticipated changes in the balance of power, including any exogenous change in actual or anticipated assistance from foreign backers. Such exogenous shocks will make the parties' commitment to power sharing time-inconsistent.

By artificially shaping the balance of power between local actors, external intervention can lead to outcomes that diverge from what the parties would expect based on their relative strength (Werner and Yuen, 2005). Thus, a history of intervention creates uncertainty over how a return to conflict would play out in the event that foreign sponsors are no longer involved. This residual uncertainty can make bargaining over governance issues difficult as the conditions that led to the initial settlement change over time. If the parties' assessments of the balance of power reflects the capabilities of *external* actors, then as external actors' capabilities change over time, so should domestic actors' incentives to abide by power sharing also change. An unexpected change in the availability of foreign assistance would question the foundations of postwar power

sharing, generating new incentives to return to war. This discussion suggests several different mechanisms:

**Weakening commitments due to change in the intervention environment.** Actual or anticipated intervention can shift the balance of power in a postwar state, undermining the parties' commitment to power sharing. Power shifts can occur as a result of one of the parties *gaining* or *losing* external support *after* a power-sharing agreement has been reached. These power shifts can be caused endogenously or exogenously. Exogenous shifts will be the most destabilizing as they are unanticipated and therefore not reflected in the terms of the power-sharing order. Exogenous shifts can be of two types:

(i) An external power that had supported a former combatant could increase or decrease its assistance to the former belligerent, as a result of requests from the former belligerent. These requests could come from radical splinter groups (spoilers), who reject a compromise deal reached by the leadership of a broader rebel movement (cf. Stedman, 1997). If the preferences of those splinter groups are not reflected in the power sharing order (which would be the case if factionalism is not anticipated at the time of bargaining to end the war), then new external support to spoilers could threaten the peace.

(ii) Exogenous developments at the systemic level could shift the domestic balance of power. Such developments include regime change in foreign patrons; the rise of a new regional power; shifting political alliances; or the emergence of new transnational movements. These systemic-level changes create new motives and opportunities for intervention on behalf of domestic groups, which could threaten the balance of power in ways that were not anticipated at the end of the war. This, in turn, could weaken the parties' commitment to power sharing.

**Bad-faith agreements in the shadow of external intervention.** If intervention creates a level playing field, foreign patrons could influence the terms of the postwar settlement by pressuring the rebels, the government, or both. The terms of the settlement need not reflect the parties' preferences, which can give rise to the following two outcomes:

(i) If one/some (but not all) local actors anticipate that commitments to local actors by foreign sponsors are time-bound, they could make concessions designed to end a war that they cannot win militarily while waiting to erode the terms of power sharing over time after foreign sponsors' commitment has weakened. This mechanism is related to the preceding discussion of exogenous power shifts in the intervening state, but it highlights the strategic motives that stronger parties face at the time of bargaining over a power-sharing agreement if there is uncertainty about the foreign sponsors' commitment. Time-inconsistency of power sharing is again at issue. An eroding power sharing agreement could result in preemptive war by weaker actors who want to arrest the decline in their bargaining leverage. Preemptive war can be beneficial while they still have capacities to re-mobilize support and re-engage their external patron.

(ii) In situations where external patrons urged rebels to accept a compromise settlement and external backing is still available, rebels have an incentive to undermine the agreement by goading the government into violating the power-sharing agreement in order to reactivate military support from the external backer. This constitutes a form of moral hazard argument by Kuperman (2008, 2013). "Moral hazard" dynamics are particularly likely when the external patron is powerful, but faces monitoring and verification problems in the postwar state, or when regime change in the foreign backer creates questions as to its commitment to its allies and its resolve (Wolford, 2007). In this scenario, former rebels will renege on the terms of power sharing so as to induce more support from their external backer.

This discussion generates the following hypothesis:

*H1: Power sharing will be less effective after civil wars with intervention relative to post-conflict environments without prior intervention.*

Bargaining failure should be more likely when the parties' relative power is imbalanced in the absence of intervention.<sup>2</sup> As rebels are almost always the weaker party, pro-rebel intervention can help level the playing field and pro-government intervention would cement an already-clear internal balance of power. Put differently, changes in foreign support for the government

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<sup>2</sup>When intervention creates a power balance, risk-accepting actors may prefer conflict to a peaceful bargain (Kydd and Straus, 2013).

should not alter the balance of power as much as changes in support to the rebels.

Prior research on conflict resolution suggests that dispersive power sharing should more easily weakened due to a shift in foreign support. Central to the commitment problem logic is the inability of one party to trust the other to uphold their end of the bargain. While dispersive power sharing gives peripheral minorities access to institutional resources to solidify support for the pursuit of self-determination, sharing power within the central government is more constraining as all government partners can monitor and police each other. Government “inclusion” also grants former rebels the power to veto government policies that affect their interests (Lijphart, 1977). Mattes and Savun (2009, 742) argue that the ability of rebels to influence government policy should make inclusive power sharing a potent fear-reducing mechanism. By contrast, autonomy agreements can be rescinded by the center and are less conducive to mutual vetos and monitoring. We therefore hypothesize further that:

*H2a: Dispersive power-sharing arrangements will be less effective after civil wars with pro-rebel intervention relative to civil wars without pro-rebel intervention.*

*H2b: Dispersive power-sharing arrangements will be less effective than inclusive power sharing after civil wars with pro-rebel intervention.*

## **Data**

We test our hypotheses drawing data on autonomy and inclusion—the two main forms of ethnic power sharing—from the 2014 version of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Vogt et al., 2015). Defining ethnicity in a broad manner that encompasses linguistic, religious, and racial differences, the EPR data collects information for all politically relevant ethnic groups in the world between 1946 and 2013. Groups become politically relevant when leaders make claims on their behalf or when the government discriminates against them.<sup>3</sup> Our analysis is restricted to post-conflict periods (we drop group-years with active conflict) and we exclude groups that monopolize or dominate the government since

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<sup>3</sup>EPR groups are sometimes aggregations of smaller ethnic groups into larger umbrella groups, and they can both split and merge in line with constructivist understandings of ethnicity.



these groups cannot experience the outcome of interest – ethnic armed conflict recurrence.<sup>4</sup>

Our outcome variable is the onset of ethnic armed conflict in a given year, as coded by the ACD2EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) which links all EPR groups to rebel organizations in the Armed Conflict Database (ACD) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014). We thus identify a new ethnic armed conflict onset if more than 25 battle-deaths occur in a given year as long as there was no fighting for at least the two previous years. We only consider conflicts in which rebel groups included in the ACD dataset claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group that is included in EPR and recruit fighters from that group. We focus on territorial or secessionist conflicts, as do previous studies (Cederman et al., 2015).

We go beyond previous studies by considering the effect of inclusion or autonomy *conditional on patterns of external intervention*. Intervention data covering the period 1975–2009 are taken from the UCDP external intervention dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér, 2011). Our analysis uses a binary indicator for intervention, which takes the value 1 if there was intervention on behalf of an ethnic group in the final two years of a previous conflict, and the value 0 otherwise. Interventions include the sending of troops as well as “the provision of sanctuary, financial assistance, logistics and military support short of troops” (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011, 5-6).<sup>5</sup>

This coding of intervention applies to the entire post-conflict period, reflecting our assumption that a recent history of intervention shapes parties’ expectations about the likelihood of future intervention if and when that is needed.<sup>6</sup> On average, 29% of conflicts with pro-rebel external intervention recur within five years as compared to 19% of conflicts with no intervention.<sup>7</sup> We later distinguish between pro-rebel and pro-government interventions by integrating

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<sup>4</sup>It is possible that multiple rebel organizations fight on behalf of a single ethnic group. If an ethnic group is “represented” by a rebel group that is already fighting the state, we do not code a new onset so as not to inflate the number of war onsets artificially.

<sup>5</sup>We code an alternative version with intervention in the last 5 years of the conflict and results are substantially the same.

<sup>6</sup>Peacekeeping interventions are not included; only partial interventions are counted. The UCDP data includes one coding of a Russian peacekeeping intervention force in Tajikistan that we code as a partial intervention; and MONUC support for the DRC government, though that support is coded alongside support for the government from the FDLR.

<sup>7</sup>This is a conservative estimate since we only count the first recurrence of conflict; in some cases, conflicts have several recurrences.

the intervention data into the UCDP Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014) and the ACD2EPR link (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012).

The EPR dataset provides the data for other key explanatory variables, including the relative size and political access of all ethnic groups (Vogt et al., 2015, 1331–2). Crucially, the dataset distinguishes between included ethnic groups, those with access to central government power, and excluded ones, those without representation in the highest executive power. Mirroring this distinction at the sub-national level, the EPR data identifies which territorially concentrated groups have regional autonomy.

Although EPR does not directly code peace agreements or constitutional provisions that protect minorities, its *de facto* coding of inclusive and dispersive power sharing encompasses both formal and less formal arrangements (also see Cederman et al., 2015, 360). Other data collections focus strictly on institutional features of power sharing, (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008), and might thus miss power-sharing arrangements granted outside of negotiated settlements. Finally, EPR codes the timing of changes in ethnic groups' power relations with the state, allowing us to distinguish between concessions that were granted prior to the outbreak of any violence (*pre-conflict* power sharing) and concessions that occurred during or after violence as a conflict management strategy (*post-conflict* power sharing).

To test our hypotheses about the effect of intervention on the stability of post-conflict power sharing, we interact the intervention variable (distinguishing between pro-government and pro-rebel intervention) with inclusive or dispersive power sharing.<sup>8</sup> We control for the full set of covariates in Cederman et al. (2015) including group size relative to all ethnic groups included in government, which proxies for groups' relative bargaining power.<sup>9</sup> Adding a linear and squared term of group size allows us to capture Lacina's (2014) hypothesis that small groups are too weak to challenge the government violently while very large groups are powerful enough to extract concessions without using violence. There should be an inverse U-shape relationship

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<sup>8</sup>In the supplement, we test the robustness of our results by using alternative data sources, specifically drawing data from Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset, which provides information on rebel organizations in all armed conflicts between 1946 and 2013 (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).

<sup>9</sup>Should the group itself be part of the government, the ratio is calculated with respect to the remaining group(s) included in government.

between group size and conflict risk.

We also control for the number of excluded groups as a proxy for reputation concerns by the government (Walter, 2009), and federal institutions to account for potential differences in the credibility of autonomy arrangements between federal and non-federal states (Bednar, 2008). Other controls include per capita GDP and population size (lagged and logged) (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011), the most robust covariates of civil war onset (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). To account for internal diffusion dynamics (Bormann and Hammond, 2016), we include an indicator for ongoing armed conflicts fought by *other* groups in the same country during the previous year, drawing again on the ACD2EPR dataset. We include an indicator for years of peace since independence or since the last conflict together with three cubic splines to address temporal dynamics (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998). Standard errors are clustered by country.

## Quantitative Analysis

To facilitate cumulative learning on the important questions addressed in our study, we anchor our analysis on the path-breaking article by Cederman et al. (2015), which analyzes the effects of inclusive and dispersive power sharing. Since we are only interested in analyzing patterns of *conflict recurrence*, we restrict our analysis to cases of post-conflict transitions, i.e. we select the “post-conflict” sample from the Cederman et al. (2015) dataset.<sup>10</sup> As our core focus is on the interaction effect of intervention and power-sharing concessions, we omit the regression table from the main text and directly turn to graphical interpretation of the risk of territorial armed conflict recurrence.<sup>11</sup>

In our analysis, we successfully recover the core finding by Cederman et al. (2015) that post-conflict autonomy is “too little, too late.”<sup>12</sup> We then test whether *any intervention* on behalf of the government, the rebels, or both sides in the previous conflict has the destabilizing effect

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<sup>10</sup>While their outcome of interest is territorial conflict recurrence, the coding of initial conflict in Cederman et al. (2015) includes cases of center-seeking rebellions, so we also adopt that practice.

<sup>11</sup>We display and explain all models in Table A1 in our supplement.

<sup>12</sup>In fact, our test is the first real test of this conjecture as their original data conflated cases of autonomy that had been in place before the outbreak of a conflict, and those concessions granted in response to armed rebellion.

implied by our theory. To do so, we interact an indicator of any prior intervention with inclusive and dispersive post-conflict power-sharing concessions. The estimates of the two interaction effects return positive and highly statistically significant. The shadow of prior intervention on behalf of the rebels or the government increases the risk of recurrence ( $H_1$ ).

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of recurrence by concession type and intervention history, based on Model 3 in Table A1. Point estimates with simulated 95% confidence intervals. All other variables held at sample means or medians.




Figure 1 shows the combined effects and reveals three crucial insights. First, the predicted probability of recurrence is always higher in the shadow of an intervention (blue) than without it (black) for conflicts that end either with autonomy or inclusion (right column in both panels). Second, comparing cases of post-conflict autonomy and inclusion, intervention creates a much higher risk of conflict recurrence in cases of dispersive power sharing arrangements than in cases of inclusive power sharing. Third, governments that do not share power with rebels face a higher risk of conflict recurrence (left column in both panels) than cases with power sharing but no intervention (black, right column in both panels). Sharing power in general and including former enemies into the central government in particular tends to pacify ethnic armed conflicts.

As we discussed above, we expect the effect of intervention to be particularly severe in cases of previous foreign support for the usually weaker rebels, and in cases where the conflict ended in autonomy rather than inclusion. Therefore, we next distinguish between pro-government and

pro-rebel intervention. In line with our expectations, only pro-rebel intervention in cases of post-conflict autonomy arrangements increases the likelihood of recurrence relative to the baseline of no intervention ( $H_{2a}$ ).

Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of recurrence by concession type and pro-rebel intervention history, Model 4 in Table A1. Point estimates with simulated 95% confidence intervals. All other variables held at sample means or medians.




Figure 2 illustrates this finding graphically: the risk of conflict recurrence is significantly higher in cases of autonomy and pro-rebel intervention (red effect, right column, left panel) than in any other baseline scenario ( $H_{2a}$ ). Additionally, autonomy displays a significantly higher risk of recurrence than inclusion in cases of pro-rebel intervention ( $H_{2b}$ ) Pro-rebel intervention destabilizes dispersive power sharing concessions after internal armed conflicts.

These results remain robust when we change the source of intervention data, include country fixed-effects, test for potentially omitted variables, and run mediation analysis instead of interaction effects. We provide more details on these tests in the supplement.

## Case Studies

Following Lieberman (2005, 440), we use case studies to answer questions that our large-N analysis leaves open “because the nature of causal order could not be confidently inferred.” Qualitative methods scholars have established several distinct goals for case studies; we focus on three of these: First, cases can help test the causal order of a theoretical argument against rival explanations in within-case comparisons to demonstrate the plausibility of the hypothesized mechanisms (Lieberman, 2005, 444; George and Bennett, 2005, 21). Second, process-tracing in case narratives helps clarify whether results in large-N statistical analyses are unlikely to suffer from endogeneity, selection, or omitted variable bias (George and Bennett, 2005; Seawright, 2016, 77; Falleti, 2006, 14; Dunning, 2015). Third, in-depth case knowledge helps identify measurement error in explanatory or outcome variables, which would weaken our confidence in the quantitative results and help us redefine or clarify key concepts (Lieberman, 2005, 445; Seawright, 2016, 77-78).

To achieve these goals, we select one typical case to corroborate theoretical mechanisms (Lieberman, 2005, 444), and two deviant cases to explore the risk of measurement error, omitted variables, and selection dynamics (Seawright, 2016, 85-89). Our typical case, the Moro Rebellion in the Philippines, lies on the causal pathway with post-conflict autonomy *and* conflict recurrence in the presence of foreign support. Our analysis illustrates the crucial role played by external support as stressed by our theoretical argument. The Second Sudanese Civil War and the Punjabi-Sikh insurgency in India constitute our two deviant cases.<sup>13</sup> The recurrence of armed conflict in Sudan points to measurement error in the outcome variable in our sample that is due to the strategic selection of rebels into a governmental rather than a territorial armed conflict, which we investigated above. The absence of recurrence in Punjab reflects the Indian counter-insurgency campaign’s ability to prevent any repeat of Pakistani support to the Sikh rebels. When deprived of sources of future external support, former rebels accepted autonomy

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<sup>13</sup>The Dinka in Sudan and the Punjabi-Sikh in India have the largest and second-largest predicted probabilities of recurrence without an actual instance of recurrence recorded in the data – the predicted probabilities in Model 6 are 14.1% and 6.4% respectively. These are large deviations from the mean and median predicted probabilities at 3.4% and 1.9% respectively.

agreements.

We provide one additional case narrative — the 1974 recurrence of ethnic conflict in Cyprus — as an out-of-sample test of our theory. This predictive exercise tests how well our mechanisms operate in a case that is excluded from the quantitative analysis. Although the EPR data in Cederman et al. (2015) include the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, their UCDP-based sample of conflicts does not code conflict in Cyprus.<sup>14</sup> The Cyprus case is consistent with our theory, which increases our confidence in the large-N statistical analysis results.

In each of the four case studies we engage in process-tracing — describing “the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable” George and Bennett (2005, 206). We exploit within-case variation to identify either the *commitment problem* or the *moral hazard* mechanisms described in the theory section and their connection to external intervention. Each narrative is informed by the theoretical argument and helps establish its plausibility, providing an important additional test of our theory that goes beyond correlation.

## **Intervention, the Moro Insurgency, and Recurrence in the Philippines**

The Moro rebellion in the southern Philippines is a long running ethno-religious conflict between the Government of the Philippines, and the Moro minority, represented by multiple rebel organizations. While the conflict started in 1969, marginalization of the Moro people, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority on Mindanao, dates back to the Spanish and American colonial periods (David, 2003). Fighting between Moro rebels and the Philippine government resulted in more than 25-battle-deaths in 1970 (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). The principal rebel outfit, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1972 under the leadership of Nur Misuari, when the conflict also crossed the 1,000 battle-deaths civil war threshold (Sambanis, 2004).

Supported by Malaysia, various Middle Eastern states, and most importantly Libya (Yegar 2002, 253-258; Bale 2004), the MNLF consolidated control over the Moro secessionist move-

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<sup>14</sup>Other civil war lists code a small civil war in Cyprus in 1963 with a recurrence in 1974 (cf. Sambanis, 2004).

ment and sustained its rebellion against the Philippine state despite a heavy-handed security crackdown initiated by President Marcos (Yegar 2002, 253-258; Bale 2004). In 1986, the Marcos dictatorship fell and his successor, President Corazon Aquino, began new negotiations with Moro rebels, specifically Misuari and his MNLF (Gross, 2007, 199). Quickly acceding to Misuari's demand of one united Mindanao province, Aquino achieved a breakthrough in the Jiddah Accord. Referenda in 1989 and 1990 yielded popular support for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the four majority Muslim provinces of the southern Philippines. Even though the remaining nine Christian-majority provinces of Mindanao remained outside the ARMM, a unified Muslim majority province was reality for the first time. The MNLF ended its armed resistance and began cooperating with the government (Gross, 2007, 202).

Yet, peace did not endure. Despite ongoing efforts of the Philippine government to negotiate even more expansive autonomy arrangements along with military power sharing by integrating MNLF fighters into the country's armed forces (David, 2003, 97), the armed conflict recurred. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under the leadership of Hashim Salamat had split from the MNLF in the 1970s. A large number of its leaders and cadres had joined the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Playing only a negligible role in the dynamics of the Moro conflict leading up to the Jiddah Accord, the MILF was ignored in the negotiations. Yet with financial and military support from Al Qaeda, Hashim Salamat brought back more and more veterans from the Afghan War to Mindanao and reignited the Moro rebellion. "More Islamically-oriented than the secularly-oriented, MNLF-dominated ARMM, the MILF represented the continuing struggle of the Moros to achieve independence rather than the acquiescence of the MNLF" (Gross, 2007, 202).<sup>15</sup>

This case illustrates how war recurrence can occur as a result of changes to the external intervention environment. Cooperation between MILF and another Islamist rebel outfit, the Abu-Sayaf-Group (ASG), and the return of MILF fighters from Afghanistan, sponsored and

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<sup>15</sup>Renewed violence in Mindanao in 1992 is coded as conflict recurrence, even though the MILF succeeded the MNLF. The same ethnic constituency is represented by both groups, although the groups' agendas were different (religious vs nationalist goals). Territorial control of Mindanao remained the central issue and there were many defections of MNLF fighters who adhered to the MILF, underlining the compatibility of the two groups' agendas.



equipped by Al Qaeda were crucial in strengthening Moro rebels' bargaining position in ways not previously anticipated by President Aquino or by MNLF leader Misuari. In this case, the key external sponsor is Al Qaeda, hence this case narrative suggests that our theory's focus could be expanded to account for intervention from non-state actors.<sup>16</sup> Insofar as this involvement by non-state actors can be considered intervention, international sponsorship clearly played a key role in MILF and ASG's decisions to reject the peace process and resume rebellion (Calculitan 2005, 28-31; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The crucial role played by an emerging transnational movement that inspired and facilitated continued violent resistance thus reflects the exogenous developments at the systematic level described by our commitment mechanism.

An important alternative explanation for the failure of autonomy is Philippine armed forces' resistance to offering the Moros a compromise. Several of Marcos' loyalists in the top military brass were dissatisfied with Aquino's sudden conciliatory stance towards the Moro rebels and other insurgents whom they had fought for twenty years. Since 1987, Aquino faced a number of coup attempts that she barely survived. Her weakened position "emboldened Moros still committed to independence rather than autonomy to reopen their struggle" (Gross, 2007, 200). Yet the weakness of the Aquino regime did not encourage Misuari and his MNLF to back down from the deal, even after the ARMM had been limited to four rather than all 13 of Mindanao's provinces. Instead the MILF whose core leadership and fighting force returned from Afghanistan, was the principal spoiler. Without its foreign sponsors, it is difficult to imagine the MILF fielding a force of 10,000-15,000 troops in the early 1990s (ibid., 201).

The MILF's and ASG's strong links to Afghanistan, and their main sources of support from radical Islamists also discredit another domestic explanation for recurrence: the discrimination experienced by Muslims in the Christian-majority areas outside the ARMM and the continued presence of Filipino troops in Mindanao. Although it is conceivable that disaffected Moros might have resumed fighting to achieve independence without the now acquiescent MNLF, the main source of violence were fighters from the MILF and the ASG. Further shedding doubt on the discrimination-recurrence hypothesis, Aquino's successor Ramos continued working with

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<sup>16</sup>The MILF may have also received support from Saudi Arabia, according to Gross (2007, 201 & fn.548).

Misuari to keep the peace process moving forward and recognized Moro autonomy in all of Mindanao's provinces in the 1996 Jakarta Agreement (David, 2003, 96-8). In light of the general conciliatory approach by two Filipino administrations, we find it unlikely that military abuses alone were responsible for the recurrence of conflict in the early 1990s.

Our case narrative supports the commitment problem logic posed by an outside rebel option. The exogenous emergence of the Islamist cleavage out of the Afghanistan War shifted the military balance on Mindanao. Although the new democratic government of the Philippines and the primary Moro rebel organization of the preceding twenty years had concluded that even a limited autonomy agreement was in both sides' best interest, the influx of foreign fighters and the resources provided by their supporters made the earlier preference for compromise time-inconsistent for a large number of Moro rebels. Limited autonomy was now insufficient and armed conflict resumed.

## **Foreign Support and the Second Sudanese Civil War, 1983-2004**

The Second Sudanese Civil War had its roots in the cultural, political, and economic division between Sudan's Arab-Muslim North and African-Christian/Animist South that predated Sudan's emergence as a state. The British decision to deny the southern Sudanese the right to join other predominantly Christian territories in East Africa upon independence created a highly unbalanced post-colonial Sudan with political and economic power concentrated in the northern capital of Khartoum. The Arab government's economic neglect of the southern regions and its refusal to live up to promises of federal reorganization set off the First Sudanese Civil War in 1963. The southern rebel organization Anya Nya fought a full-blown civil war for nine years to gain independence (Sambanis, 2004).<sup>17</sup> With Israeli support, the Anya Nya gained autonomy in the 1972 Addis Abeba Accord (Ali, Elbadawi and El-Batahani, 2005, 199). The ACD2EPR does not code any conflict recurrence, as the Second Sudanese Civil War was fought to change the central government of Sudan rather than for secession. As we will show below this change in war aims was a strategic move by the rebels to attract foreign support without which armed

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<sup>17</sup>Niblock (1987) and Johnson (2016) provide excellent overviews of the North-South conflict.

conflict would have been far less likely.

After a decade of uneasy but peaceful North-South relations, changes in the international environment changed the calculus of leaders on both sides. Assured by a new military alliance with Egypt and military support from the United States, Sudan's President Nimeiri ordered southern army units to redeploy to the north in September 1982 where they could be checked by northern troops loyal to the government (Dixon and Sarkees, 2015, 115). The order backfired and triggered multiple mutinies by southern soldiers in late 1982 and early 1983. Initially, the Sudanese government opted to negotiate with the mutineers and sent a southern soldier and former Anya Nya rebel, John Garang, to negotiate. When President Nimeiri decided to abandon the negotiations and sent northern soldiers to fight the mutineers on May 16th, Garang joined the latter in their retreat to Ethiopia where they would unite with other rebels and form the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (ibid.).

Garang and his allies "moved quickly to establish a strong military structure and arranged robust external support, most notably from the Derg regime in Ethiopia" (Ali, Elbadawi and El-Batahani, 2005, 200). Ethiopia's government began to support Sudanese dissidents directly in 1976 in response to continued Sudanese support for Eritrean secessionist (Johnson, 2016, 59). To secure support for armed rebellion, the SPLM/A adopted a Marxist agenda and declared revolutionary regime change in all of Sudan rather than secession from the North as its primary goal. Without any prior history or meaningful social support base in southern Sudan, the adoption of a Marxist outlook made sense only to attract the support from the communist Ethiopian government. Although "[t]he circumstances surrounding the formation of the SPLA and Garang's assumption of leadership of it remains murky, (...) there is little doubt that the Ethiopian Derg and its leader Haile Mengistu Mariam played a critical role" (Young, 2005, 438).

Foreign support to both the government and the rebel side thus proved crucial in the outbreak of violence. Assured by military support from the United States and Egypt, President Nimeiri sent northern soldiers to the south and escalated the conflict from negotiation with mutinous southern soldiers to open military confrontation. Likewise, John Garang knew the importance

of external backing from the first Sudanese Civil War and moved quickly to attract full-scale military support from the Ethiopian government (cf. Ali, Elbadawi and El-Batahani, 2005, 200). The developments closely follow our first mechanism of a weakening commitment to the peace agreement due to a change in the intervention environment.

But was intervention crucial for the outbreak of civil war, or would violence have resumed anyway? Tensions between North and South were rising, and President Nimeiri intended to divide the southern region and promised to introduce country-wide Sharia rule in order to placate Islamist rivals in Khartoum. The central question is whether Garang and other southern rebels had decided to join the mutinous soldiers and instigate full-blown rebellion with promises for Ethiopian support in mind. According to Johnson (2016, 61), “Garang was already party to the conspiracy among some officers in the Southern command who had been planning the defection of battalion 105 to the guerrillas.” He and other veterans from the first Sudanese Civil War were involved in smuggling arms to one of their former brother in arms hiding in Ethiopia as early as 1982 (Dixon and Sarkees, 2015, 115). We argue that Garang’s early involvement in planning a rebellion and the strategic decision to change the rebels’ goal from secession to revolutionary overthrow of the Sudanese government to secure Ethiopian backing is strong evidence for the central role of external support in the conflict’s recurrence.

The onset of external support in inciting a new civil war fits the temporal order of events better than alternative grievance explanations. President Nimeiri’s steps towards weakening or even repealing southern autonomy present the greatest challenge to our argument. Indeed, major violence only broke out after the Khartoum government divided the south into three provinces in June 1983. Yet the mutinies of southern soldiers began as early as 1982 and John Garang himself disputed the idea that the division of the south was the trigger for the Second Sudanese Civil War, “pointing out that the rebel army had gone into the bush before the redivision” (Mampilly, 2012, 138, fn.10).

Two other policies by the Khartoum governments began earlier and caused substantial dissatisfaction among southern Sudanese. First, yielding to the pressure of Islamist hard-liners, Nimeiri had made efforts to harmonize Sudan’s laws Sharia commandments as far back as 1977.

However, Nimeiri waited until July 1983 to introduce Sharia legislation in parliament and only implemented this divisive policy in September – several months after the first southern soldiers had mutinied in February 1983 (Niblock, 1987, 288), and after the SPLM had been founded in Ethiopia (see Warburg, 1990, 624-628). Second, northern soldiers sent to the south to fight Islamist insurgents harassed southern Sudanese from late 1981 onward. While these abuses might have moved Garang and other SPLM leaders to prepare plans for rebellion, the importance of foreign support for a successful uprising become evident when considering that Garang and the mutineering troops immediately left to Ethiopia to found the SPLM. This sequence of events suggests that the second rebellion was strategically planned with foreign support in mind.

Our qualitative analysis of the Second Sudanese Civil War—a deviant case according to our large-N analysis—reveals that measurement error in the outcome variable is responsible for this classification. Sudan did experience a recurrence of civil war in 1983, though our data source does not classify the governmental civil war onset as a recurrence of the first conflict because that was fought over secession. Once we recognize that the change in goals reflected a strategic move by the rebels to attract intervention, then this becomes a typical case for our argument. The availability of new sources of external support changed the balance of power and questioned both the government's and the rebels' commitment to the autonomy arrangement that had ended the first war in 1972.

## **Denied Intervention in Punjab**

A secessionist insurgency in India's federal state of Punjab took place from 1984-1993. The Indian government fought multiple rebel organizations representing the Punjabi-Sikh – one of India's oldest non-Hindu religious minorities. Punjabi-Sikh demands for linguistic and regional autonomy date back to the foundation of India in 1947, and were partially recognized by the reorganization of the federal state of Punjab in 1966. Yet key demands by Punjabi-Sikh political leaders, in particular the inclusion of Punjab's traditional capital Chandigarh, remained unfulfilled (Brass, 1988, 200). In the early 1990s, the Indian government defeated the rebellion

*and* returned territorial autonomy to the state. Since then, the armed conflict has not recurred (Sambanis, 2004; Pettersson and Eck, 2018). Yet our statistical analysis predicts the second highest risk of renewed violence in the entire sample. We probe this deviant case and discover an additional scope condition for the theory — a decisive government victory can shut the door to anticipated future foreign support, thereby reducing the risk of recurrence even where rebels had external assistance in the previous war.

In the early 1980s, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's attempts to politically weaken the Sikhs backfired, leading to hundreds of deaths during a misguided military operation (Staniland, 2015, 694). Following Indira Gandhi's assassination by two of her own Sikh bodyguards, anti-Sikh riots occurred throughout India, which strengthened extremist voices among the Punjabi Sikh, leading hundreds of young men underground to fight for an independent Sikh state (Chima, 2014, 262-3). Rebel organizations such as the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) received support from the Sikh Diaspora and Pakistan. In early 1985, AISSF fighters and leaders fled to Pakistan from where they launched operations (Sharma, 1995, 88) and KCF fighters bought weapons from Pakistan (*ibid.*, 147-8). Fair (2009, 126, fn.13) states that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) provided "training, money, and weapons, and it maintained Pakistan-based pro-Khalistan media operations" (also see Marwah, 2009). Although some observers claim that Pakistan continues to support an independent Sikh state (Fair 2009, 126, fn.13; Wallace 2015, 16), the armed conflict ended in 1994 and has not recurred.

Two reasons stand out as we consider why Sikh combatants did not return to arms despite Pakistan's proximity and its hostility to the Indian state. First, the Indian government militarily defeated Sikh rebel organizations and secured the Punjabi border to Pakistan (Marwah, 2009, 102). Second, it reinstated autonomy and cooperated with moderate, non-violent Sikh political parties such as the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), which had previously operated within Indian constitutional rules to demand greater autonomy but not independence (Brass, 1988). Thus, the option of renewed assistance from Pakistan was removed, thereby neutralizing this key mechanism of conflict recurrence.

In 1992, the Indian government lifted President's Rule from the Punjab and reintroduced elections at the communal and state level in subsequent years. After many of the Punjabi-Sikh voters boycotted the February 1992 elections, the India's founding party, the Congress, gained a dominant electoral victory (Singh, 1992). The new Chief Minister Beant Singh and Director General of Police K.P.S. Gill, both Sikhs, clamped down heavily on the insurgents with little regards to civil and human rights. The combination of an ethnically Sikh political leadership and a brutally effective counter-insurgency campaign overpowered the Sikh rebels and reduced the levels violence substantively (Chima, 2014, 270-2). By 1995 "the militants had ... lost whatever sympathy they had among the masses..." (Kumar, 2017, 50), and have not regained it since. Fourteen years later Van Dyke (2009, 976) observed that "even the most determined proponent of Khalistan must concede that few are interested in that subject [independence] today in Punjab."

High levels of turn-out in the 1995 municipal and 1997 state elections brought moderate Akali Dal leaders into power. Partially dependent on coalitions with the India-wide and nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the SAD completely abandoned its pursuit of Sikh identity policies affecting language and religion, and has been emphasizing "the effective maintenance of public order, better infrastructure and less corruption" (Kumar, 2017, 53). The 1997 election thereby concluded the return to Sikh self-rule even if many of the demands for greater autonomy or even independence had not been met (Chima, 2008, 256). Rather than rewarding extremist actors fighting on behalf of a marginalized ethnic group that had never experienced any self-rule, autonomy in the Punjab contributed to conflict resolution because it was a return to normalcy that shifted power to moderates.

Yet the more important difference to other cases lies in the outcome of the civil war. Unlike in Mindanao and in southern Sudan, the Indian government did not reach a compromise settlement with the rebels. Instead by 1995, "there were no active militant groups left in Punjab. All of them had either been wiped out or were based in Pakistan. The militants had been crushed" (Chima, 2008, 215). To achieve military victory, hundreds of thousands of Indian troops had

secured the Punjabi border with Pakistan (Fair, 2009, 110 & 115).<sup>18</sup> The clear-cut outcome and the high capacity of the Indian state distinguishes the Punjab rebellion from other cases in that the Indian state effectively denied external support to aspiring rebels.

Our case narrative underlines earlier research that highlights governmental victory as an important condition for the success of power sharing after civil war (Mukherjee, 2006). A similar logic operated in the Punjab even if no official peace agreement had been signed, and prior foreign support for the rebels should weaken any post-conflict settlement. Showcasing the value of our mixed methods approach, process tracing of the Punjab Insurgency and its aftermath reveals a potentially omitted variable, conflict outcome, in our statistical model. However, adding a further interaction term to our regressions asks too much of the data with its limited number of cases.<sup>19</sup> After investigating the Punjab case, we explored the effects of prior conflict outcomes in our statistical analysis without interacting it (see Table A4). Relative to armed conflicts that end in low activity, government victory decreases the likelihood of conflict recurrence without affecting our main results. We find no difference to cases that end in rebel victory or peace agreements. Rather than promoting government victory in general, our case narrative highlights the importance of cutting off foreign support via government victory.

## **Competing Interventions and Conflict Recurrence in Cyprus**

Cyprus achieved its independence from Britain in 1960, following a brief period of anti-colonial struggle led by the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA.<sup>20</sup> Being in power for the first time, the majority Greek population (80%) was dissatisfied with the disproportional influence of the minority Turkish population in the small republic's new institutions, specifically the inclusive power-sharing arrangement through a Turkish Vice-President. After the Greek Cypriot President attempted to abolish the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President and disman-

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<sup>18</sup>Securing the border succeeded in Punjab but not in Kashmir, where the mountainous terrain makes border surveillance far more difficult (Telford, 2001, 16).

<sup>19</sup>Adding a further interaction keeps us obtaining precise statistical estimates as we encounter the “curse of dimensionality.”


<sup>20</sup>This case narrative draws on Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Kitromilides and Worsley (1979); Ertekun (1984); Polyviou (1980); Hitchens (1984) in addition to memoirs and other sources cited below.



the further elements of the power-sharing arrangement, rioting and ethnic clashes broke out in December 1963. In 1964, inter-communal violence turned into intrastate armed conflict with international support, as the Turkish air force intervened militarily in targeted air strikes against Greek Cypriot military and civilian targets.

After the initial armed conflict, United Nations peacekeepers managed to foster a cease-fire by policing a boundary (the “green line”) that divided the two communities in the capital city Nicosia and beyond the city. Subsequently, a gradual process of territorial partition began whereby Turkish Cypriot elites, with military support from Turkey, established defensible enclaves throughout the island and encouraged Turkish Cypriot civilians to move there for their protection. These enclaves amounted to “involuntary” dispersive power sharing, as the Greek Cypriot government did not agree to them and was refused access to the enclaves. The UN-sponsored peace process reduced violence to almost zero between 1969 and 1974, when conflict recurred (see Figure 3). As we show below, renewed fighting was directly related to changes in patterns of external intervention that destabilized the internal politics of Cyprus.

Figure 3: Incidents of inter-ethnic violence in Cyprus, 1964-1975



Sources: UN Docs. S/5593, S/5750, S/5764, S/5950, S/6102, S/6228, S/6426, S/7350, S/8664, S/9233, S/9521, S/9814, S/10005, S/10199, S/10401, S/10664, S/10842, S/10940, S/11294. An entry of zero does not mean that there were no incidents, but rather that there was no report for that trimester. Further, note that the months including the coup and invasion of 1974 are omitted from the chart to highlight the impact of the 1974 intervention on levels of inter-communal conflict. The figure is reprinted with permission from Doyle and Sambanis (2006)

The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict database neither codes the original armed conflict, nor its subsequent recurrence.<sup>21</sup> Sambanis (2004) codes this case as an ambiguous case of civil war from 1963-1967 as the continuous violence criterion might not be satisfied for the entire period and the death threshold is low. However, this case meets all other criteria and the level of violence was high for such a small country. Cyprus is an out-of sample case because our quantitative analysis relies on the UCDP/PRIO ACD database. The fact that the case is not coded as a civil war in that data set provides an opportunity to explore whether the mechanisms highlighted in our theory are in operation beyond our original sample.

After 1964, the Greek government under Prime Minister George Papandreou had moved away from the idea of *enosis* (union of Cyprus and Greece) due to pressure from the United States which was worried about a possible military confrontation between NATO members. While this was consistent with public opinion in Cyprus, as most Greeks also preferred independence over *enosis*, Greek extremist groups, such as EOKA B', persisted in their commitment to unify Cyprus with Greece. Kept in check by political leaders in Athens, these groups did not move against the ongoing peace negotiations on the island. Change within the military dictatorship in Greece in 1973 brought about a hardline faction of the Greek army, which was far more sympathetic towards *enosis*. The coup changed the calculus of Greek Cypriot hardliners, and gave EOKA B' leader General George Grivas the green light to overthrow Cypriot President Makarios in favor a Greek proxy.

That move was a risky gamble for resurrection by a regime that was losing its hold on power and mistakenly believed that it had the tacit approval of the United States. On the other side of the Aegean, Turkish hardliners came to power via a coup and they would capitalize on the opportunity to escalate their degree of influence over the conflict in Cyprus. A coup and assassination attempt against Makarios served as a signal to the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey that diplomacy would not resolve the Cyprus problem. The resumption of violence in 1974 is causally connected to exogenous political shocks in the two external sponsors of local actors

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<sup>21</sup>Personal communication revealed that UCDP coders cite a lack of sufficient evidence for the ACD battle-deaths criterion, and the necessary levels of organization by Turkish rebels. However, the Cypriot Army and Turkish militias were actively engaged in the conflict (Joseph, 1997).

in Cyprus. As both Greece and Turkey took hardline stances in their foreign policies, they supported extremist positions via their proxies in Cyprus, which led to conflict escalation.

Between 1968-74, a refinement of the power-sharing agreement encoded in the 1960 constitution seemed possible. The inter-communal talks of 1968 were led by Greek Cypriot Speaker of the House Glafcos Clerides (who would later become President) and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, who was initially prepared to accept local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots within a Greek Cypriot-dominated central government. In his memoirs, Clerides writes that Denktash's proposals were "well within what is accepted generally as normal local government functions" and he was willing to support them.<sup>22</sup> Progress was blocked due to the intervention of President Makarios, who insisted on the abolition of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-Presidency, the abrogation of the 1959 Treaties of Guarantee, the creation of a unified voter roll, and a unified regional council appointed by the House with jurisdiction over Greek and Turkish Villages (Dekleris, 1981, 48). Denktash and his supporters in Turkey perceived those demands as a sign of intransigence on Makarios's part.

Makarios mistakenly believed that he could play American, Russian, and British interests against each other and imagined Cyprus as a valuable new member of the non-aligned movement of countries; but he had miscalculated the importance of this tiny island in the scope of great power diplomacy. The final round of talks produced near agreement by the end of 1972. The negotiators' memoirs reflect the degree of consensus attained around key issues (Dekleris, 1981), yet Makarios refused to accept the negotiated outcome because he feared this would cost him the nationalist vote in the upcoming elections (Clerides, 1990, 367). As it turned out, he was correct that these concessions would be unacceptable to hardliners; yet his refusal to agree was insufficient to appease them and the Cypriot national guard became divided between his supporters and hardline factions. In the Fall of 1973, regime change in both Greece and Turkey brought to power new elites who opposed further negotiation. On July 15th 1974, the Greek dictators staged a coup in Cyprus and five days later Turkey invaded, ending six years of peaceful negotiations and irrevocably overturning the power-sharing agreement of 1960. The Turkish

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<sup>22</sup>See Clerides (1989, 236-237). Details of the proposals are also given in Denktash (1988).

invasion resulted in a brief war that ended with a Turkish victory and occupation of 40% of the island. The territorial partition of Cyprus persists to this day.

This case study illustrates that both inclusive and dispersive power-sharing agreements can be unstable in conflicts with extensive external intervention. Domestic politics in the intervening states can result in exogenous changes to the degree and scope of intervention and support to foreign proxies can change in ways that are not anticipated at the time of signing of a power-sharing agreement. In Cyprus, the recurrence of violence in 1974 cannot be understood without focusing on the interests of foreign powers.

## **Conclusion**

In this study, we have investigated the influence of foreign rebel supporters on the effectiveness of autonomy arrangements after ethnic armed conflicts. Alarmingly, we find that territorial power sharing does not prevent conflict recurrence when rebels have an outside option in the form of a foreign patron. Our quantitative analysis reveals that foreign government support to rebels in a previous civil war increases the likelihood that rebels return to the battlefield even after gaining autonomy concessions. Our qualitative case studies demonstrate that a prior or continued experience of external support either by states or non-state groups plays a crucial role in the decision to fight the government once more.

Corroborating the main insight of Cederman et al. (2015) that autonomy after civil war is “too little, too late” when unaccompanied by power sharing at the center, our findings offer one potential mechanism that underlies the instability of post-conflict territorial power sharing. Whereas previous research has focused on autonomy arrangements’ role in addressing grievances (McGarry and O’Leary, 2005), strengthening separate ethnic identities (Roeder, 1991), and governments’ resistance to effectively sharing territorial power (Toft, 2002), we argue that the potential of external support increases rebel confidence to withstand renewed counter-insurgency campaigns and extract greater concessions from the central government.

In the last two decades, conflict researchers have demonstrated the beneficial impact of im-

partial, UN-led third-party interventions to end civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2004). Others point to the conflict-reducing effect of governments supported by foreign powers prior to the outbreak of any armed conflict (Cunningham, 2016). In contrast to those studies, our findings underscore the negative consequences of partial interventions where the intervener takes sides and becomes party to the conflict. Political scientists know that biased external military and economic support to conflict parties extends the duration of fighting and increases the intensity of civil wars (Regan, 2000, 2002; Lacina, 2006). In light of the negative implications of such interventions, the increase in the share of armed conflicts with foreign involvement from less than 10% in the 1990s and early 2000s to 40% in 2017 should be of great concern to policy-makers (Pettersson and Eck, 2018).

Our study makes clear that scholars of civil war must consider the impact of international systemic factors on domestic conflicts (cf. Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010; Sambanis, Skaperdas and Wohlforth, 2020). Highlighting the changing nature of international politics from a US-led unipolar system to a multipolar arena of great power competition, Barry Posen (2017) predicted that UN peacekeeping missions would become less frequent at the same time as biased interventions on behalf of the government, the rebels, or both would increase. According to our analysis, such a development will fundamentally weaken the peace-inducing effects of territorial power sharing in the aftermath of civil war.

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## Appendix

### *Outside Options: Power-sharing in the Shadow of External Intervention after Civil War*

#### Tables

Model 1 in Table A1 presents the baseline estimates of the effects of inclusion and autonomy on ethnic armed conflict recurrence.<sup>23</sup> We replicate the main result in Cederman et al. (2015): inclusion correlates negatively and significantly with recurrence; and there is no statistically significant association between autonomy (dispersive power-sharing) and conflict recurrence. Although Cederman et al. (2015) find a conflict-reducing effect of autonomy in their full sample, their estimated post-conflict effect consists of the autonomy estimate and the postwar-autonomy interaction.

Cederman et al. (2015) do not distinguish between pre- and post-conflict concessions. However, it is crucial to do so if we want to ascertain whether autonomy concessions effectively end civil wars. In Model 2 of Table A1, we control separately for power-sharing concessions that were in existence prior to the initial war onset (*prior inclusion; prior autonomy*) and cases where concessions were made in the final years of fighting or the post-conflict period (*PC inclusion; PC autonomy*). We find a consistently negative association between inclusive power-sharing and conflict recurrence, regardless of whether power-sharing was in effect before conflict onset or if concessions were made post-conflict. By contrast, there is no statistically significant correlation between post-conflict autonomy and conflict recurrence; and pre-conflict autonomy is *positively* associated with conflict recurrence.<sup>24</sup> Dispersive power sharing after civil war really is “too little too late.”

Next, Models 3 and 4 contain the models presented in the main text that distinguish between concessions granted before and after conflict. Finally, we investigate the interaction between concessions at any point in time, and intervention to compare our results more directly to the Cederman et al. (2015). Interacting past intervention on behalf of any conflict side with inclusion and autonomy diminishes the conflict-reducing effect of the former, and increases the conflict risk of autonomy provisions (Model 5). Model 6 distinguishes between pro-government and pro-rebel intervention, and reveals a slightly more careful effect. Past intervention on behalf of rebels in the context of regional autonomy arrangements strongly increases conflict risk. However, pro-government intervention plus autonomy arrangements, pre-existing or not, decreases conflict risk. The effects of intervention on conflict recurrence in the presence inclusion are muted.

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<sup>23</sup>Our Model 1 is equivalent to the estimated interaction effects between inclusion, autonomy, and the postwar dummy in Model 3, Table 3 in Cederman et al. (2015, 362).

<sup>24</sup>Note that this finding does not undermine the generally positive effects of autonomy on peace for groups without any prior conflict experience as reported by Cederman et al. (2015). We suspect that the positive correlation we find here stems from a selection effect. Once ethnic groups rebel against the state even when they have autonomy, their grievances must be so large that nothing short of independence satisfies them.

Table A1: Post-conflict power sharing, intervention, and the risk of recurrence, 1975-2009.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inclusion	-1.33*** (0.46)				-2.11*** (0.39)	-1.36** (0.58)
Autonomy	0.13 (0.31)				-0.70 (0.47)	-0.43 (0.43)
Prior Inclusion		-2.10*** (0.38)	-1.50*** (0.43)	-1.70*** (0.50)		
Prior Autonomy		0.95*** (0.35)	0.69* (0.40)	1.12*** (0.40)		
PC Inclusion		-0.94* (0.56)	-1.65*** (0.39)	-0.74 (0.61)		
PC Autonomy		0.02 (0.32)	-1.16** (0.54)	-0.91** (0.45)		
Intervention history			-0.50 (0.31)		-0.53 (0.32)	
Gov. intervention				0.23 (0.31)		0.27 (0.32)
Rebel intervention				-0.66* (0.37)		-0.72* (0.39)
PC Inclusion X intervention hist.			1.03* (0.56)			
PC Autonomy X intervention hist.			2.07*** (0.67)			
PC Inclusion X gov. intervention				-0.49 (0.89)		
PC Autonomy X gov. intervention				-0.64 (0.46)		
PC Inclusion X reb. intervention				-0.13 (0.90)		
PC Autonomy X reb. intervention				3.05*** (0.76)		
Autonomy X intervention hist.					1.59*** (0.57)	
Inclusion X intervention hist.					1.06** (0.51)	
Autonomy X gov. intervention						-0.87* (0.44)
Inclusion X gov. intervention						-0.34 (0.83)
Autonomy X reb. intervention						2.73*** (0.84)
Inclusion X reb. intervention						-0.22 (0.81)
Constant	-5.17*** (1.45)	-5.36*** (1.46)	-4.30*** (1.49)	-4.98*** (1.38)	-4.11*** (1.35)	-4.25*** (1.38)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,619	1,619	1,361	1,361	1,361	1,361
$\ell$	-207.22	-206.55	-178.64	-175.94	-179.73	-176.89
AIC	442.44	445.10	395.28	395.87	393.46	393.78

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Standard errors clustered on country.

The nature of our observational, cross-country data make it difficult to establish the causal effect of intervention or autonomy. Our analysis is limited to establishing correlations between these our key explanatory variables and war recurrence consistent with prior theory. First, we test how our findings behave when we alter our explanatory or outcome variables. We also use a different source of intervention data, drawing on the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009), and find substantively similar results even though the two data sets differ in more than 40 cases of intervention.<sup>25</sup>

Second, since country-specific sources of unobserved heterogeneity are likely to influence the results, we re-estimate regressions using country fixed effects and the results hold (see Table A3). We also explore the effect of outcomes on prior conflicts and differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods for Models 3&4 in Table A4 without finding any changes to our main results. To further guard ourselves against bias introduced by omitted variables, we analyze how sensitive the key interaction term of interest is to potential confounders. To do so we simulate potentially excluded variables at different levels of correlation with both our main explanatory and our outcome variable (Imbens, 2003). If the interaction between autonomy and intervention loses statistical significance when introducing simulated variables that are only weakly correlated with the interacted terms and the outcome variables, our results would be quite unconvincing. However, not a single simulated variable overturns the significant result for the interaction between autonomy and *rebel* intervention (in Models 3 & 4 in Table A1 - results in Figure A1).

Third, we conduct causal mediation analysis to see whether the relationship between autonomy and conflict recurrence is mediated by previous interventions.<sup>26</sup> The results of this exercise allow us to disentangle whether the negative effect of autonomy on conflict recurrence mostly runs through the intervention mechanism (Average Causal Mediation Effect), or whether it contains a more directly negative effect (Average Direct Effect). As expected by our theory, The analysis shows that intervention histories mediate the effect of autonomy on conflict recurrence in Models 3–4 (Table A1). The Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) for autonomy is significant at  $p = .00$  and  $.02$  Models 3–4, respectively (see Figure A2.) This analysis supports our theoretical prior that autonomy can *indirectly* increase the risk of conflict recurrence conditional on a history of foreign support.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>For the NSA analysis refer to Table A2. Whereas the tests for  $H_1$  remain unchanged, those for  $H_{2a+b}$  exhibit a lower degree of statistical significance.

<sup>26</sup>See Tingley et al. 2014.

<sup>27</sup>Note, however, that omitted variable bias could produce exaggerated estimates of mediation effects. The results we present in the appendix depend on the assumption that the treatment is considered random conditional on included covariates, and the model contains any variables correlated with both the mediating and outcome variable.

Table A2: Power sharing, intervention (NSA), and recurrence risk, 1975-2009.

	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prior Inclusion	-1.92*** (0.29)	-1.87*** (0.31)		
PC Inclusion	-2.30*** (0.33)	-1.11* (0.64)		
Prior Autonomy	0.75* (0.40)	0.78** (0.38)		
PC Autonomy	-0.58 (0.40)	-0.30 (0.34)		
Inclusion			-2.61*** (0.29)	-1.69*** (0.49)
Autonomy			-0.55 (0.38)	-0.38 (0.30)
Intervention history	-0.06 (0.36)		-0.09 (0.37)	
Gov. intervention		0.30 (0.39)		0.18 (0.42)
Rebel intervention		-0.14 (0.38)		-0.13 (0.39)
PC Inclusion × intervention hist.	1.46** (0.68)			
PC Autonomy × intervention hist.	1.06* (0.58)			
PC Inclusion × gov. intervention		0.13 (1.27)		
PC Autonomy × gov. intervention		0.78 (0.57)		
PC Inclusion × reb. intervention		-0.39 (1.14)		
PC Autonomy × reb. intervention		0.63 (0.56)		
Autonomy × intervention hist.			1.09** (0.52)	
Inclusion × intervention hist.			1.48*** (0.56)	
Autonomy × gov. intervention				0.90* (0.50)
Inclusion × gov. intervention				0.77 (0.96)
Autonomy × reb. intervention				0.67 (0.48)
Inclusion × reb. intervention				-0.33 (0.82)
Constant	-5.79*** (1.26)	-5.43*** (1.29)	-5.49*** (1.30)	-5.42*** (1.42)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,989	1,989	1,989	1,989
$\ell$	-216.67	-217.61	-216.28	-216.63
AIC	471.35	479.22	466.55	473.25

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors clustered on country.



Table A3: Power sharing, intervention, and recurrence risk with fixed effects, 1975-2009.

	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prior Inclusion	-1.13 (1.40)	-0.99 (1.51)		
PC Inclusion	-0.47 (1.14)	1.59 (2.11)		
Prior Autonomy	0.71 (1.07)	1.27 (1.14)		
PC Autonomy	-0.94 (1.00)	-1.47 (1.31)		
Inclusion			-0.87 (0.84)	0.58 (1.67)
Autonomy			-0.23 (0.84)	-0.05 (1.04)
Intervention history	-0.42 (0.43)		-0.41 (0.43)	
Gov. intervention		0.42 (0.56)		0.44 (0.55)
Rebel intervention		-0.77 (0.65)		-0.86 (0.66)
PC Autonomy × intervention hist.	1.86* (1.01)			
PC Inclusion × gov. intervention		0.17 (1.83)		
PC Autonomy × gov. intervention		-2.43** (1.22)		
PC Inclusion × reb. intervention		-2.83 (1.90)		
PC Autonomy × reb. intervention		4.31*** (1.38)		
Autonomy × intervention hist.			1.16 (0.86)	
Autonomy × gov. intervention				-2.55** (1.21)
Inclusion × gov. intervention				0.86 (1.61)
Autonomy × reb. intervention				3.29*** (1.12)
Inclusion × reb. intervention				-2.73 (1.70)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,694	1,694	1,694	1,694
$\ell$	-128.60	-122.25	-129.91	-124.35

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Dropped interaction between inclusion and intervention history in Model 3 and inclusion pro-rebel intervention in Model 5 due to perfect prediction.

Dropped time-constant control variables: relative group size and federalism.

Table A4: Post-conflict power sharing, intervention, additional controls, and the risk of recurrence, 1975-2009.

	(3a)	(4a)	(3b)	(4b)
Prior Inclusion	-1.40*** (0.38)	-1.55*** (0.46)	-1.46*** (0.41)	-1.63*** (0.49)
Prior Autonomy	-1.75*** (0.40)	-0.91 (0.69)	-1.60*** (0.39)	-0.72 (0.61)
PC Inclusion	0.49 (0.31)	0.98*** (0.32)	0.56 (0.41)	1.01** (0.40)
PC Autonomy	-0.99** (0.49)	-0.70* (0.40)	-1.05* (0.56)	-0.79* (0.46)
Intervention history	-0.25 (0.35)		-0.59* (0.31)	
Gov. intervention		0.48 (0.30)		0.13 (0.33)
Rebel intervention		-0.62 (0.40)		-0.68* (0.37)
PC Inclusion X intervention hist.	1.19** (0.59)		0.85 (0.60)	
PC Autonomy X intervention hist.	1.95*** (0.70)		1.93*** (0.66)	
PC Inclusion X gov. intervention		-0.03 (1.00)		-0.52 (0.87)
PC Autonomy X gov. intervention		-1.45** (0.63)		-0.57 (0.46)
PC Inclusion X reb. intervention		-0.69 (0.92)		-0.25 (0.86)
PC Autonomy X reb. intervention		3.77*** (0.66)		2.84*** (0.79)
Peace Agreement	-0.96** (0.42)	-1.36*** (0.42)		
Gov Victory	-0.94* (0.52)	-1.03* (0.55)		
Rebel Victory	-1.30*** (0.48)	-0.83** (0.42)		
Cold War			0.64* (0.35)	0.56 (0.35)
Constant	-3.54** (1.58)	-4.28*** (1.46)	-4.61*** (1.53)	-5.15*** (1.42)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,361	1,361	1,361	1,361
$\ell$	-173.62	-168.42	-177.37	-175.04
AIC	391.25	386.84	394.74	396.08

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Standard errors clustered on country.

Baseline for conflict outcomes: low activity.

Having completed the quantitative analyses, we more carefully investigated our sample. In Model 4, where we interact post-conflict autonomy and intervention, we only have ten cases of armed conflict onset, five of which occur in India (see Table A5).<sup>28</sup> These ten cases represent a fifth of all recurrence cases, a third of all post-conflict groups with autonomy, and more than 70 percent of all recurrence cases with regional autonomy. Although our analysis so far turned up fairly robust evidence that external intervention on behalf of the rebels is correlated with a diminished effectiveness of autonomy concessions as a conflict resolution strategy, we partially address the small number of cases through additional qualitative case studies.

Table A5: Ethnic groups with autonomy, intervention in prior civil war (UCDP External Intervention Data), and subsequent recurrence.

Country	Ethnic Group	Rebel Group	Recurrence	Previous Conflict	External Support
United Kingdom	Irish Catholics	Real IRA	1998	1971-1991	Libya
Mali	Tuareg	ATNMC	2007	1994	?
Ethiopia	Oroma	Oromo Liberation Front	1998	1994-1995	Sudan
India	Assamese	United Liberation Front of Assam	1994	1990-1991	Pakistan
India	Bodo	National Democratic Front of Bodoland - RD	2009	1993-2004	Pakistan
India	Indigenous Tripuri	All Tripura Tribal Front	1992	1979-1988	Pakistan
India	Naga	National Socialist Council of Nagaland	2000	1992-1997	Pakistan
India	Naga	National Socialist Council of Nagaland - K	2005	2000	Pakistan
Philippines	Moro	Moro Islamic Liberation Front & Abu Sayyaf	1993	1970-1990	Libya

While both the UCDP Armed Conflict Database (ACD) and the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset identify almost the same number of cases which experienced a recurrence of armed conflict after prior intervention and autonomy to the ethnic group, the two samples differ slightly. The ACD exclusively identifies the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the All Tripura Tribal Front as recipients of foreign support whereas the NSA data exclusively single out the Manipuri People's Liberation Army as recipients of external support.

The two datasets differ more widely still. The ACD codes pro-rebel intervention in 50 of the initial armed conflicts, out of which 15 recur. In contrast, the NSA identifies 57 occurrences of pro-rebel intervention initially and 14 cases of recurrence. These cases of recurrence do not overlap perfectly. Out of the 50 cases of pro-rebel intervention in the ACD, only 29 are also recorded by the NSA data. Conversely out of 57 cases recorded in the NSA dataset, only 36 also show up in the ACD.


<sup>28</sup>Nine of the ten cases experience pro-rebel intervention. Table A6 lists cases of intervention in the NSA data.

Table A6: Ethnic groups with autonomy, intervention in prior civil war (Non-State Actor dataset), and subsequent recurrence.

Country	Ethnic Group	Rebel Group	Recurrence	Previous Conflict	Faction
United Kingdom	Irish Catholics	Real IRA	1998	1971-1991	1
Mali	Tuareg	ATNMC	2007	1994	0
Ethiopia	Oroma	Oromo Liberation Front	1998	1994-1995	0
India	Assamese	United Liberation Front of Assam	1994	1990-1991	0
India	Manipuri	People's Liberation Army	1992	1982-1988	0
India	Manipuri	People's Liberation Army	2003	1992-2000	0
India	Naga	National Socialist Council of Nagaland	2000	1992-1997	0
India	Naga	National Socialist Council of Nagaland - K	2005	2000	1
Philippines	Moro	Moro Islamic Liberation Front & Abu Sayyaf	1993	1970-1990	1


## Figures

Figure A1: Sensitivity analysis of interaction between autonomy and all/rebel interventions, models 3–6 in Table A1.



*Notes:* Circles represent simulated variables. Their correlation with intervention (conflict recurrence) is on the x (y) axis. Circles are blue when the estimated coefficient on the interaction between all/rebel intervention history and autonomy remains significant at .05 and red otherwise. Black circles represent the same correlations between other covariates in the models for comparison.

Figure A2: Mediation analysis, Models 3-6 in Table A1.



Notes: Black dots and solid lines represent estimate for intervention cases. Grey dots and dotted lines represent estimate for non-intervention cases. We computed these estimates with the help of the **mediation** package in **R**.